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Journal of the American Academy of Religion Advance Access originally published online on July 17, 2009
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 2009 77(3):461-493; doi:10.1093/jaarel/lfp037
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© The Author 2009. Published by Oxford University Press, on behalf of the American Academy of Religion. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Restricting the Scope of the Ethics of Belief: Haack's Alternative to Clifford and James

Rose Ann Christian

Rose Ann Christian, Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Towson University, 8000 York Road, Towson, MD 21252, USA

E-mail: rchristian{at}towson.edu


   Abstract

In "‘The Ethics of Belief’ Reconsidered," Susan Haack sets about to determine the relation of epistemic to ethical appraisal. She promotes her account as an alternative to the "morally over demanding" position of W. K. Clifford and the "epistemically over permissive" proposal of Wm. James. An "overlap" between epistemic and ethical appraisal obtains, on her view, only when individuals are responsible for holding epistemically unjustified beliefs that result in or directly threaten harm. In my discussion, I explore the terms of Haack's attractive proposal in order to consider its implications for a question she does not consider but that exercised both Clifford and James: that of the ethical permissibility of epistemically unjustified religious belief. Adopting Haack's measured approach, I argue, would serve not only to focus contemporary debate over religious belief, but perhaps also to moderate its tone and to engage concerned believers.


An earlier version of this paper was read at the American Academy of Religion, 2007 Annual Meeting. I wish to thank my respondent, William Hart, for his comments, as well as my co-panelists and members of the audience for a thoughtful discussion. I would like also to thank the journal and its anonymous readers for offering helpful perspective and suggestions.


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